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Abstract 
Many studies exist on whether Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs) improve firms’ 
environmental performance.  Furthermore, the literature on VEPs theorizes that specific features 
contribute to program performance.  This study examines the ability of Voluntary Environmental 
Programs to reduce emissions and the role of institutional design on their performance.  
Specifically, this study aimed to identify if specific features influence performance more than 
others do.  The indicator of performance focuses on the overall emission reductions of firms 
across years 2007-2009.  To analyze performance and features, the study examines the emission 
data and design features of each program.  The results reveal the ability of the VEPs to reduce 
emissions and a combination of features that may have a greater influence on performance.  This 
suggests that the success of VEPs rely on their ability to institute these features.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental policies, Voluntary Environmental Programs, VEP
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Introduction 
Over the last three decades, Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs) gained support 
from many industries as an alternative to government regulation to address environmental 
concerns.  However, the efficacy of VEPs to reduce pollution remains an open question for 
environmental activists and scholars.  Further, many question whether existing VEPs employ 
appropriate design features to ensure efficacy.  This study addresses these questions with the 
examination of four VEPs and their firms’ performance in reducing hazardous air emissions.   
The federal government began regulating environmental policies in the late 1960s, 
followed by the creation of the EPA in 1970 (EPA 2011).  Catastrophic events, such as Love 
Canal and Three Mile Island increased public concern about environmental pollution and 
changed how the U.S. government addressed environmental problems.  The passage of 
significant environmental legislation, including the Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, and the Clean Water Act, addressed environmental policy through government 
regulation (EPA 2011).  By the 1980s, command and control regulation mandated environmental 
policies.  Command and control regulation refers to government regulation wherein agency 
administrators create legally binding standards, such as emission limits, and the use of specific 
production technologies (Potoski and Prakash 2005).  These regulations control the emissions of 
environmental pollutants through mandates (e.g., emissions taxes) and penalties (Dawson and 
Segerson 2008).   
Though initially successful, command and control regulations eventually garnered 
criticisms from scholars and businesses alike as being inflexible and costly (Darnall and Sides 
2008; Dawson and Segerson 2008).  Furthermore, the EPA struggled to fulfill regulatory 
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mandates to ensure compliance due in part to limited funding of necessary oversight activities 
(e.g., inspections) (Darnall and Carmin 2005).  As a result, alternative instruments to 
environmental policy became attractive to governments, businesses and stakeholders.   
One such alternative was Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs).  VEPs are 
programs that firms join voluntarily in order to pursue environmental stewardship beyond 
government compliance.  Subsequently, VEPs became major instruments for implementing 
environmental policies in many arenas including government and industries.   
The demand for a cost-benefit approach to environmental regulation spurred support of 
VEPs as an alternative regulatory instrument (Koehler 2007).  The nature of VEPs allows firms 
to avoid costly legislation, monitoring and enforcement (Arora and Cason 1996).  The 
expectations of VEPs are to improved environmental conditions without the cost and 
inefficiencies of government regulation (Dawson and Segerson 2008).  However, VEPs do not 
replace existing regulations.  Instead, they should move firms beyond regulations and address 
issues overlooked by government regulations (Koehler 2007).  The high expectations of VEPs 
are evident by their extensive involvement in governments, industries and nongovernmental 
organizations.  
Still, VEPs are not without their own critics.  At the center of the VEP debate are 
questions about their efficacy. Given the voluntary nature of VEPs, it is unclear whether these 
programs actually provide environmental protection and improve human health (Daley 2007).  
Many consider VEPs to be “greenwashes,” a term that refers to a superficial display of 
environmental concern by an organization in order to undermine unfriendly environmental 
practices (Cambridge Dictionary Online 2011).  VEPs function as greenwashes because 
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participating firms can simply signal environmental commitment without actually improving 
their environmental performance.  By law, government regulators cannot enforce a voluntary 
program (Arora and Cason 1996).  Thus, to consumers and stakeholders, VEP membership can 
signal environmental concern without providing evidence of actual environmental performance.   
The criticisms of VEPs led many scholars to examine their ability to reduce pollution.  
The analysis of VEPs performance also fostered the examination of their institutional designs.  
This study has two goals: to test the ability of VEPs to reduce emissions and to compare the 
efficacy of various design features of the VEPs.  To reach these objectives this research 
examines four VEPs.  The study focuses on the performance of the firms in each VEP and the 
specific design features of each VEP.  The indicator of performance is their overall emission 
data.  The comparison of their design features examines the similarities and differences of each 
VEP.  
The high expectations, criticisms, and multiple design features of VEPs fueled the 
decision to study their program efficacy.  Yet, their known program failures (e.g., free riding) 
motivate the examination of their institutional design.  If VEPs performed properly, the expected 
benefits would affect not only firms but also the public, governments, and stakeholders.  VEPs 
represent ideal public-private partnerships between businesses and governments to fulfill public 
policy.  The study is vital because it takes into account a combination of features that may 
influence program performance.  Furthermore, VEPs are unique in the sense that government 
regulation purses compliance through voluntary measures.  Since, governments seek to pursue 
vital public policy with voluntary measures, ensuring that VEPs succeed requires a critical 
assessment of what influences performance.   
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Literature Review 
Voluntary Environmental Programs are an approach to fostering environmental 
protection without command and control regulation.  Though these programs are popular, their 
effectiveness in improving environmental compliance and performance is unclear.  Current 
literature on VEPs provides a foundation for understanding their popularity, purpose, firms’ 
participation and effectiveness.   
There are three types of VEPs: industry-led (e.g., the automobile industry), government 
(i.e., a government-led program with private participants), and industry-government (i.e., a 
program jointly created by government and a specific industry for that industry i.e., Aluminum 
industry).  Each type of program may have different institutional designs, overall performance 
and public perception; however, they are fundamentally the same.   
Governments, industries and regulatory agencies adopt voluntary environmental 
programs for various reasons. VEPs are popular when the threat of regulation is high (Koehler 
2007). The threat of regulation under mandatory environment protocol motivates firms to seek 
membership in voluntary programs (Khanna and Damon 1999).  Firms will seek VEP 
membership if the anticipated costs are less than the anticipated costs to comply with 
government orders (e.g., eco-taxes).  VEPs, especially industry programs, allow firms to preempt 
regulation by committing to environmental goals (Koehler 2007).  For example, government 
agrees not to impose a regulation on the firms if the environmental target is achieved voluntarily 
(Alberini and Segerson 2002).  In general, firms participate in VEPs largely because they 
perceive a benefit that outweighs the cost of participation or at least no net loss from 
participation (Alberini and Segerson 2002).   
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VEPs provide direct benefits to firms such as public recognition through newsletters, 
press releases and awards.  Firms also receive technical assistance that provides innovative ways 
to reduce pollution, which lowers the cost of learning about best practices (Khanna and Damon 
1999).  Member firms receive benefits, such as a positive “brand name,” that exclude 
nonparticipating firms (Potoski and Prakash 2005).  The utility of these benefits may depend on 
the individual firms.  For example, firms closer to consumers (e.g., firms controlling the final 
product) benefit more from VEP membership because they assume consumers are willing to pay 
a higher cost for a product that reduces environmental impact (Arora and Cason 1996).  This 
implies that firms that do not directly sell to consumers benefit less from “green branding”; 
instead, they benefit more from publicity from stakeholders (e.g., customers, sponsors). 
The publicity from joining a VEP signals to consumers that firms are environmentally 
conscious (Arora and Cason 1996).  This signaling of environmental stewardship contributes to 
the criticisms that VEPs are simply “greenwashes.” The type of VEP chosen (e.g., industry 
versus government) also depends on the perception of the firms.  Firms seek membership in 
specific types of VEPs depending on the benefits.  For example, if a firm seeks to reduce the cost 
of environmental regulation they would likely join a government-sponsored program.  However, 
if they seek to enhance their environmental reputation within the industry, they would likely join 
an industry program (Darnall et al 2009).  Thus, firms chose VEPs that convey their level of 
desired environmental stewardship.  Hence, firms select a VEP strategically based on the 
expected level of publicity and benefit.   
Despite the benefits of membership, joining a VEP can impose significant costs on firms.  
The costs are investments made to improve environmental performance (e.g., equipment, 
technology, materials, employee training) (Khanna et al 2007).  Most VEPs require firms to 
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make substantial investments in pollution prevention activities.  Some also require the 
implementation of a costly environmental management system (EMS) (Darnall et al 2009) that 
provides firms with strategies to reduce environmental impact.  It also helps firms develop an 
environmental policy, which states their commitment to prevent pollution, plans for continual 
improvement and compliance with environmental regulation. (BSI 2011).  For example, 
certification to International Standardization Organization (ISO) 14001 ranges from $25,000 to 
over $100,000 per facility (Potoski and Prakash 2005).  Furthermore, the costs associated with 
joining a VEP varies for each firm.  For example, larger firms face higher adoption costs because 
they have to collect and apply more information, train more people and implement new 
technologies on a wider scale (Khanna et al 2007).  Firms also face increased operation costs, 
and they risk the loss of customers and investors from a damaged reputation if performance is 
not improved (BSI 2011).  
VEP Performance  
Despite the costs associated with a VEP, they remain attractive to many firms.  However, 
their popularity does not hinge upon their environmental performance and does not necessarily 
mean they are effective.  While some are arguably successes (e.g., EPA’s Green Light Program), 
scholars have identified many that were failures (e.g., EPA’s Performance Track) (Moon 2008; 
Kohler 2007).   
Scholarly literature identifies free riding and shirking as the main problems that plague 
VEPs, and conceivably lead to their failure.  Free riding is the tendency of firms to underperform 
but still benefit (e.g., receive recognition from stakeholders and consumers) from the overall 
success of the VEP (Potoski and Prakash 2007).  Shirking is the intentional avoidance of 
program obligations and standards by member firms (Potoski and Prakash 2005).  Firms have 
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strong incentives to free ride and shirk.  For example, Koehler (2007) argues that 
underperforming firms avoid making the financial investments necessary to reduce pollution, but 
still benefit from the VEP success.  Furthermore, participating in a VEP still signals 
environmental compliance and performance to consumers and stakeholders.  Since VEPs, by 
definition, are voluntary, they attract free riding and shirking firms.  This is further aggravated 
because most VEPs lack penalty for underperformance.  With the lack of penalty enforcements, 
some firms may intentionally fail.  The incentives to free ride and shirk contributes to the loss of 
efficiency in overall program performance (Dawson and Segerson 2008).   
Design Features 
The literature identifies multiple design features associated with VEP performance.  The 
features extensively discussed include oversight and enforcement features such as sanctioning, 
auditing, reporting, and certification.  Scholars argue theses features may address the concerns 
about free riding and shirking.  The literature also discusses the role of other features such as 
positive, tangible incentives and performance targets on program performance.  Theoretically, 
institutional design is the “parts” that share a significant relationship to the effectiveness or 
“whole” of the VEP.  If free riding and shirking cripples the “whole” program, then the “parts” 
must be ineffective.  Thus, program design features should abate these program failures.   
Oversight and Enforcement  
Oversight and enforcement features sanction, monitor and audit member firms for 
undesirable participation and outcomes.  Potoski and Prakash (2007) argue that monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms can force members to comply with standards, which can control free 
riding and shirking.  In order for these mechanisms to work, Potoski and Prakash (2007) argue 
that VEPs need three components: third-party monitoring, public disclosure of audit finding and 
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sanctioning by program sponsors.  They define these elements of the sanctioning mechanisms as 
“swords”; strong sword programs have audits, disclosure and sanctioning mechanisms.  Medium 
sword programs require third-party audits and public disclosure but no sanctioning mechanisms 
and weak sword programs only require third-party audits (Potoski and Prakash 2007).  However, 
the majority of VEPs do not have these combinations of features. 
Sanctioning and auditing  
VEPs adopt sanctioning mechanisms to reprimand program participants for 
underperformance.  Auditing mechanisms monitors if firms are complying with standards.  
Literature highlights the desirable effects oversight and enforcement has on improving VEPs 
performance (Rivera, Deleon, & Koerber 2006).  For example, King and Lenox (2000) found 
that the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program had informal punishments such as 
publicly denouncing underperforming firms.  However, in the absence of formal sanctions, they 
did not improve members’ performance in pollution abatement.  Furthermore, they found that 
participating firms reduced emissions slower than nonparticipants did.  For VEPs, sanctioning 
mechanism must pose a low cost to implement but a high cost for firms.  For firms, the costs are 
not necessarily fines, but instead negative publicity.  If firms gain more publicity from 
participation, which ultimately affects their profitability, then firms should pay a high cost for 
failed performance, which is the loss of that publicity.  Sanctioning can publicly denounce a 
firm’s performance, which may result in a negative image that undermines their profits.    
Auditing is another oversight feature found in VEPs.  Government sponsored VEPs 
generally are self-monitoring programs, in which they self-evaluate their adherence to program 
requirements and report to a program manager.  However, VEPS rarely verify their.  Even if a 
firm fails to meet the goals, there is often no instrument to sanction failing participants (Darnall 
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and Sides 2008).  Industry-sponsored programs also lack third party monitoring and sanctions for 
poor environmental performance (King and Lenox 2000).   
Sachs (2002) demonstrated in a study of the ski industry’s Sustainable Slopes Program, 
that the lack of sanctioning and third party oversight contributes to their criticisms as a 
“greenwash”.  The International Standardization Organization’s (ISO) 14001 program also 
receives significant criticism despite requiring third party auditing.  ISO 14001 lacks sanctioning 
and public disclosure of audit findings, which would help ensure that firms improve 
environmental performance (Darnall and Sides 2008).  Darnall and Sides (2008) did find 
however, that participation in ISO 14001 would produce greater environmental performance over 
a self-monitored VEP, but this comparison is weak since self-monitored programs perform so 
poorly.  Whereas, Potoski and Prakash (2005) argue that stronger VEPs (e.g., 33/50) had better 
requirements such as public disclosure of audit findings, which contributed to their stronger 
performance. 
Reporting 
Reporting is another oversight feature that relates to auditing.  Reporting is not a design 
feature extensively covered in literature, but recognized as an approach that may influence 
program performance.  Reporting is the annual submission of program performance progress 
(e.g., attaining the stated goals).  Firms submit reports annually to the VEPs through online or 
mail-in forms.  However, firms easily avoid reporting because no sanctioning mechanisms exist 
to make firms comply with this requirement.  Furthermore, lax sanctions on reporting breed free 
riding and shirking of program obligations due to the diminished view of the requirement 
(Delmas and Kreller 2005).   Delmas and Kreller (2005) found that Waste Wise, which makes 
reporting central to the program had low reporting rates due to the lack of sanctions associated 
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with non-reporting.  Interestingly, they also concluded that even programs with extensive 
emergency management systems are not likely to report. 
Certification 
Certification is another oversight mechanism found in some VEPs.  Firms seek 
certification to signal that they have met the standards of the program.  Certification signals that 
participating firms have committed to their standards of environmental compliance (International 
Organization for Standardization 2011).  Certification is either voluntary or mandatory, and 
obtained from different sources.  An authorized certifying entity such as American Systems 
Registrar and ABS Quality Evaluations offers third party certification.  However, self-
certification allows firms to declare themselves compliant with program standards. (International 
Organization for Standardization 2011).  Considerable research has been conducted on the ISO 
14001 program.  Much like Responsible Care, ISO’s 14001 requires firms to adopt an 
environmental management system (EMS), which then requires firms to obtain certification 
(International Organization for Standardization 2011).  Mixed evidence of efficacy exists on 
whether certification to ISO 14001 leads to improved environmental performance.  Andrews, 
Hutson, and Edwards (2006), found in their comparative study of 3,189 certified ISO EMS and 
noncertified ISO manufacturing facilities that participating firms made moderate reductions in 
other mediums, such as energy use, hazardous waste, spills and leaks, but not in air and water 
pollution.  However, Matthews (2001) found in his analysis of automobile assembly facilities 
that there was no difference in environmental performance between facilities with and without 
ISO certified EMSs.  
Incentives 
Incentives are another feature with the potential to increase program performance.  These 
incentives refer to a tangible reward given to firms for continued or improved environmental 
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performance.  Tangible incentives are lacking in most VEPs, and literature offers little on the 
efficacy of incentives on program performance.  The current incentives for performance in VEPs 
are similar to the incentives to join a VEP (e.g., publicity).  Some VEPs especially those found in 
public entities do not offer financial incentives or more incentives than traditional regulatory 
mechanisms.  As a result, VEPs fail to improve environmental behavior (Lyon and Maxwell 
2007).   
The long-term feasibility of VEPs depends on their impact on a firm’s profitability, yet 
they lack positive incentives (Khanna and Damon 1999).  King and Lenox (2000), suggest that 
positive, financial incentives may increase a firm’s environmental performance and abate free 
riding and shirking.  However, public recognition will likely only have a small impact on a 
firm’s bottom line and will not encourage large investments in pollution reduction (Lyon and 
Maxwell 2007).  Public recognition will not necessarily guarantee a profit, but positive 
incentives can effectively guarantee firms can gain a monetary benefit (Alberini and Segerson 
2002).  The anticipated return from a firm’s participation lies in the level of abatement obligation 
and the extent of the financial incentives provided (Alberini and Segerson 2002).  Thus, if 
incentives can increase environmental performance and effectiveness, then VEPs should offer 
greater incentives.   
Despite the arguments for positive incentives, they may not have the ability to improve 
environmental performance.  In her research of the EPA’s Performance Track program, Koehler 
(2007) finds that changes in environmental performance was minimal because the program did 
not sufficiently recognize and provide incentives for performing members.  She found that 
legally allowable incentives (e.g., tax breaks) do not offer adequate financial rewards to 
encourage firms to make the investments required to improved environmental performance.  
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Thus, the incentive constraint directly influences the performance of Performance Track and 
other VEPs (Koehler 2007).  This implies an incompatible relationship between policy and 
intent.  If VEPs expect firms to make costly investments in pollution abatement, then they need 
to offer sufficient incentives in order to encourage and continue a firm’s environmental 
performance.  Appropriate incentives for participation should depend on the firms’ 
characteristics.  This implies that the design of VEPs needs to attract targeted groups of firms.  
As a result, VEPs have to offer different financial incentives depending on the firms’ abatement 
levels. (Alberini and Segerson 2002). 
Performance Targets 
Setting performance targets is also a feature found in some VEPs.  The targets are 
typically general in nature and set by the firms themselves. Performance targets often reveal the 
areas of environmental stewardship that firms seek to improve or prioritize.  One study, in an 
analysis of 33/50, Climate Wise and Climate Challenge, found that this requirement did not 
encourage significantly higher pollution reduction above the status-quo because participating 
firms set very low performance targets (Darnall and Sides 2008).  Generally, VEPs require 
participants to establish and meet self-determined environmental targets but weak goals 
contribute to the underperformance of program participants.  Thus, if VEPs allow weaker goals 
than those required by regulation, then participating firms will be less likely to improve 
environmental performance than nonmembers will (Darnall and Sides 2008).  This suggests that 
the strength of the goals is problematic not necessarily the requirement of goal setting.  Current 
literature does not offer much evidence about the performance of VEPs that strongly encourage 
firms to set explicit reduction goals.  Explicit reduction goals are those with aggressive reduction 
targets.  In the case of ISO 14001 and Responsible Care, the programs focus on enhancing 
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management strategies to establish a systematic approach to setting objectives (International 
Organization for Standardization 2011; Responsible Care 2011). The ISO 14001 does not require 
firms to specify levels of environmental performance (International Organization for 
Standardization 2011).  
Government Investments  
Whether these programs are successful or not, governments make significant investments 
in VEPs.  The federal government via the EPA offers program participants technical assistance, 
financial and environmental analysis tools, training, seminars, toolkits, and environmental 
performance benchmarking strategies.  Participants have access to not only the EPA’s resources 
but also the resources of other organizations including laboratories and consultants (Benefits of 
Becoming a Partner 2011).  Furthermore, the salaries of program administrators to implement the 
approximately 60 different VEPs housed under the EPA, is also a government investment.  
Governments expect firms to return their investments by reducing environmental pollution and 
damage. 
Most literature finds little evidence of the benefits of VEPs, but in theory, these programs 
can be effective with correct institutional design.  Ideally, if firms improve their environmental 
performance through voluntary efforts, it would reduce governmental pressures and regulations.  
This ensures a “win-win” situation for firms.  Literature explains both the success and failures of 
VEP, but it does reveal a consensus amongst scholars about the potential effects of design 
features on effectiveness.  Nevertheless, literature does not provide much empirical evidence 
about the effectiveness of specific design features. 
Thus, this study argues that the success or effectiveness of VEPs lies in their design 
features.  Programs with sanctioning mechanisms and programs with explicit reduction targets 
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should perform better.  According to literature, lax regulatory mechanisms contribute to the 
program failures prevalent amongst VEPs.  This implies if VEPs had sanctioning institutions 
they would improve their performance.  This study accepts this argument because sanctioning 
mechanisms create a sense of consequence, which would motivate firms to improve performance 
to avoid the negative publicity generated from sanctioning.   
Literature also found that goal setting is largely ineffective if the goals are too weak.  
This argument is persuasive because the stated goals of firms in VEPs are often general which 
can result in immeasurable goals.  Explicit reduction targets, in contrast, are specific and provide 
measurable goals that have direct influence on improving environmental impact.  While the other 
features may contribute to VEPs’ performance, they may be less important than sanctioning and 
reduction targets.  The study analyzes sanctioning and reduction targets for two reasons.  
Literature offers extensive coverage on the influence of sanctioning mechanisms but offers 
limited coverage on explicit reduction targets; thus, this research seeks to analyze the influence, 
if any, these features have on performance.  If sanctioning mechanisms and explicit reduction 
goals positively impact VEP performance, we may conclude that they are features that are more 
important then incentives and certification.  The question this research seeks to answer is 
whether sanctioning and reduction targets affect effectiveness.  This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Programs with sanctioning mechanism will perform better than programs with no 
sanctioning mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 2: Programs with reduction targets will perform better than programs with no 
reduction targets. 
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Methodology 
This is primarily a comparative study using secondary data.  The data were obtained from 
the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and Greenhouse Gases Inventory (GHG).  The 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) require the EPA and States 
to collect data annually on the transfer and releases of specific toxic chemicals from industrial 
facilities.  The facilities submit the data through a report form, which is made public through the 
TRI database.  The purpose of the TRI is to inform communities about toxic release chemicals 
and waste management activities (EPA 2011).  Facilities annually submit greenhouse gases data 
through a report to the EPA, which then becomes public through the GHG Inventory.   
The EPA’s databases were selected because they provided a single source of data instead 
of multiple, independent sources.  The study uses descriptive statistics (e.g., histograms) and 
inferential statistics (e.g., test of statistical significance) to analyze the independent variables 
(design features) and the dependent variables (program effectiveness) to analysis the data. 
To test the hypotheses, I examined four VEPs.  The VEPs sampled in the research are 
Responsible Care, Climate Leaders, ISO 14001 and Louisiana’s Environmental Leadership 
Program (ELP).  I selected these VEPs because they represent different types of programs and all 
report emissions data, which meets the research’s criteria.  Furthermore, these emissions reports 
are publicly available data.  The study compares the Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPS) and 
Greenhouse Gas emission data from the four VEPs and their design features.  This research 
examines the performance of each VEP by analyzing their ability to reduce emissions.  
Therefore, while HAPs and Greenhouse Gases are different types of emissions, it does not affect 
the comparison of program performance.  Table 1 illuminates the background of the four 
programs. 
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Table 1 Voluntary Environmental Programs Studied 
Program VEP 
Size1 
Founded Program Type Type of Firms2 Type of 
Emission3 
Stated 
Objective  
ISO 14001 1000+ 1996 International 
Organization 
Manufacturing, 
Chemical Paper, 
Wood, Petroleum, 
Plastics/Rubber, 
Metals, 
Transportation, 
Textiles 
Chemical  Reduce 
harmful 
environmental 
effects and to 
improve 
environmental 
performance 
Responsible 
Care 
100-
500 
1984 Chemical Chemical  Chemical Encourage the 
chemical 
industry to 
constantly 
improve its 
health, safety 
and 
environmental 
performance 
Climate 
Leaders 
200-
300 
2002 Federal 
Government 
Manufacturing, 
Chemical, Paper, 
Wood, Petroleum, 
Plastics/Rubber, 
Metals, 
Transportation, 
Textiles 
Greenhouse 
Gases 
Assist firms in 
developing 
strategies to 
reduce their 
impact on the 
global 
environment 
ELP Up to 
100 
1995 State 
Government 
(Louisiana) 
Chemical, 
Manufacturing, 
Paper, Petroleum, 
Plastics and 
Rubber, Metals 
Chemical  Promote a 
cleaner 
Louisiana 
through 
voluntary 
pollution 
prevention, and 
other 
environmental 
efforts 
 
The International Standardization Organization offers an environmental management 
standard known as ISO 14001.  ISO 14001 provides facilities with environmental management 
strategies, which requires them to adopt an Environmental Management System (EMS).  An 
 
1
 Size of Program refers to the number of participating firms within the United States.  
2
 Type of firms refers to the firms included in each program. This list is not inclusive of all types of participating 
facilities. The firms included in this research are US firms only.  
3
 Type of emission refers to the primary emission focus of the study.  
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EMS requires firms to develop an environmental policy that states a commitment to prevent 
pollution and plans for continual environmental performance.  Next, it requires firms to produce 
objectives (e.g., targets for environmental improvement and a management program to achieve 
it).  Firms must train proper personnel usually starting from top management on down.  It then 
requires firms to undergo assessment and implementation reviews.  A certifying entity will 
perform both a document review and site visit.  Last, firms must certify their EMS.  They must 
meet these standards and obtain certification through self-certification or third party certification 
(BSI 2011).  Thus, the voluntary program is the adoption of the 14001 standard and EMS.  The 
14001 standard is at the facility level.  Each individual facility of a company must meet the 
requirements of the above standards independently.  Any organization in any sector can pursue 
ISO 14001 certification.  ISO 14001’s program design features include mandatory auditing with 
no public disclosure of audit findings, mandatory certification through either self-certification or 
third-party certification, no formal sanctioning mechanism, no reporting requirements and no 
requirement of explicit reduction targets.  Based on these features, ISO 14001 is considered a 
“weak” program as defined by Potoski and Prakash (2007). 
Responsible Care is the chemical industry’s VEP, which also requires participants to 
adopt an EMS.  Like ISO 14001 standards, the EMS provides environmental management 
strategies to assist companies in improving environmental performance, safety, and health.  
Thus, the voluntary program is the adoption of the EMS.  Unlike, ISO 14001, Responsible Care 
is at the company level.  All facilities belonging to a participating company adopt the EMS.  
Responsible Care only admits chemical companies for membership.  Responsible Care’s design 
features include mandatory auditing with no public disclosure of audit findings, mandatory 
certification through third-party certification only, no formal sanctioning mechanism, mandatory 
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reporting, and no requirement of explicit reduction targets.  Responsible Care is a “weak” 
program based on their features as defined by Potoski and Prakash (2007).   
Climate Leaders is an industry-government voluntary program that works with 
companies to set environmental management strategies.  The program requires members to 
maintain a greenhouse gas inventory based on a quality management system.  Unlike 
Responsible Care and Climate Leaders, Climate Leaders encourage organizations to set 
aggressive reduction targets.  Any organization in any sector can join Climate Leaders.  Climate 
Leaders’ design features include no auditing requirements and no mandatory certification but if 
desired firms could self-certify or obtain third party certification.  Their primary sanctioning 
policy is removal or expulsion after continued failed performance; and they encourage setting 
reduction targets.  Despite these features, Climate Leaders is a “weak” program as defined by 
Potoski and Prakash (2007).  
Louisiana’s Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) is a state run program that 
requires organizations to improve environmental performance by adopting an internal 
management system and encouraging pollution and waste reduction targets.  ELP is also at the 
facility level.  Any organization of individual in Louisiana can join ELP.  ELP’s design features 
include no mandatory auditing, certification, or sanctioning mechanism, but they encourage 
explicit reduction targets.  ELP is a “weak” program based on their features as defined by 
Potoski and Prakash (2007).        
The VEPs’ respective websites provide participating companies.  The American 
Chemistry website provides a list of participating companies in Responsible Care.  The EPA’s 
website provides a list of participating companies in Climate Leaders.  ISO does not publicly list 
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participating firms.  However, a list of about 200 ISO 14001 participants can be accessed from 
the Environmental, Health and Safety Online website.  The roster list of certifying entities such 
as ABS Quality Evaluations, Advantage International Registrar, and Eagle Registrations 
provided the remaining participants for ISO 14001.  These certifying entities also confirmed the 
participants accessed from The Environmental, Health and Safety Online website.  Current 
literature, the programs’ respective websites and Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) 
identified the design features of each VEP.  Table 2 below displays the program design features 
of each VEP. 
Literature provided the features significant to VEPs.  The features examined include 
auditing, certification, sanctioning, reporting and explicit reduction targets.  This research uses 
guiding definitions of the program design features.  Auditing is the monitoring of program 
participants to ensure compliance with program standards.  Public disclosure is the public release 
of audit findings.  Certification is the accreditation of program participants to signal compliance 
to program standards.  Depending on the VEP, certification is either mandatory or voluntary and 
obtained through self or third party certification.  Sanctioning is the mechanisms taken by the 
program to reprimand participants for underperformance.  Expulsion is the dismissal of 
participants from the program.  Reporting is the submission of participants’ program 
performance progress.  Reporting is usually done annually and allow the VEPs to track 
participates’ progress towards goals.  Reduction targets are goals with an explicit abatement level 
of pollutants. 
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Table 2 Program Design Features 
 
The study compares the emission data across the years 2007-2009.  The emissions data 
for ISO 14001, Responsible Care and ELP measure total Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs).  The 
data for Climate Leaders measure total Greenhouse Gases (GHG).  The EPA identifies 188 air 
toxics as HAPs pollutants.  HAPS have hostile environmental effects and cause cancers, 
reproductive problems, and birth defects.  HAPs affect individuals through breathing the toxics 
and consuming contaminated food products.  HAPs are largely human-made toxics derived from 
mobile sources (e.g., automobiles), stationary sources (e.g., power plants), indoor sources (e.g., 
cleaning products).  They also come from natural sources (e.g., forest fires) (About Air Toxics 
2010).  Greenhouse gases affect both people and the environment, but the primary damage 
occurs to the climate.  Greenhouse gases cause adverse environmental effects by trapping heat in 
the atmosphere.  Natural (e.g., carbon dioxide) and human-made sources (e.g., sulfur 
hexafluoride for industrial processes) create greenhouse gases.  GHGs cause climate change, 
which subsequently affects people.  The EPA identifies many prevalent diseases, reduced farm 
Program 
Name 
Auditing  Certification Sanctioning  Reporting  Reduction 
Targets  
Responsible 
Care 
Mandatory-Yes 
Public Disclosure- 
No 
Mandatory-Yes 
Third Party-Yes 
Self-No 
 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-No 
Yes No 
Climate 
Leaders 
Mandatory-No 
Public Disclosure-
No 
Mandatory-No 
Third Party-Yes 
Self-Yes 
 
Formal-Yes 
Expulsion-Yes 
Yes Yes 
ISO 14001 Mandatory-Yes  
Public Disclosure- 
No 
Mandatory-No 
Third Party-Yes 
Self-Yes 
 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-No 
No No 
ELP Mandatory-No 
Public Disclosure-
No 
Mandatory-No 
Third Party-No 
Self-No 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-No 
Yes Yes 
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productivity, severe floods and droughts, rising sea levels, and loss of habitat amongst others the 
result of climate change (Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2011).  HAPs and GHG are pollutants of 
synthetic or natural sources that affect both the environment and humans.  The difference in type 
of pollutant is not significant since the analysis focuses on the overall percentage change in 
emissions of firms.  
The EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database provided the data for Responsible 
Care, ISO 14001 and Environmental Leadership Program.  The American Chemistry website 
identifies 100 participating companies in Responsible Care.  The population sampled for 
Responsible Care is all participating firms with HAPs data reported in the TRI database for years 
2007, 2008, 2009.  The sample for Responsible Care consists of eighty-two different firms that 
met this criterion.  The population sampled for ISO 14001 is all participating facilities with ISO 
14001 certification and/or in place by year 2007 and with HAPs data reported in the TRI 
database for years 2007, 2008, 2009.  The sample for ISO 14001 consists of eighty-eight 
different firms that met this criterion.  Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality identified 
88 companies on their Environmental Leadership Program website.  Unlike the other VEPs, ELP 
has a very diverse roster of companies.  For example, a significant number of members consist of 
universities, towns, convenience stores, nonprofit organizations, etc.  Therefore, the study 
examines only those members in similar industries to the other VEPs.  The reduction resulted in 
a population of 46 firms in similar industries, which makes it the smallest VEP studied.  The 
population sampled for ELP is all firms with HAPs data reported in the TRI database for years 
2007, 2008, 2009.  The sample for ELP consists of fifteen different firms that met this criterion.  
The EPA’s GHG Inventory form provided the data gathered for Climate Leaders.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency website identified 274 participating companies in their 
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Climate Leaders VEP.  The sample for Climate Leaders was all companies with greenhouse 
gases emission data reported in the Greenhouse Gases Inventory for years 2007, 2008, 2009.  
Fifty-one firms representing separate companies met this criterion.  
This analysis employs a comparative approach to test the hypotheses.  The study utilizes 
the percent change formula to analyze the emission data for the years 2007-2009.  For statistical 
significance, Difference of means and proportion tests exam the statistical significance between 
the VEPs’ data.  
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Results 
Again, the change in emissions from 2007-2009 is the primary indicator of performance.  
Figure 1 shows the average percentage change in emissions for each VEP.  First, each VEP has a 
net negative reduction in emissions.  This suggests that all the programs on average produce 
some reduction in emissions.  However, it is still unclear how these reductions compare to non-
participating firms.   
Figure 1 Average Emission Reduction of VEPs 
 
Second, there is a clear leader amongst the three VEPs in emission reductions.  The chart shows 
that ELP had the highest reduction in emissions, followed by ISO 14001, Climate Leaders and 
Responsible Care.  Figure 1 shows that ELP has a -20% average reduction from years 2007-
2009.  ISO 14001 follows ELP with a -18% reduction, Climate Leaders with a -16% reduction 
and Responsible Care with a -12%.  The results show that the average emission reduction varies 
little amongst all VEPs.  
-20%
-18%
-16%
-12%
-25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0%
ELP
ISO 14001
Climate Leaders
Responsible Care
Voluntary 
Environmental 
Programs
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While this examination of average change in emission is helpful in comparing programs 
it does not fully describe the difference between VEPs.  The average percent change overlooks 
other variation in the distribution of change within the programs.  This information can revel if 
firms are free riding or shirking in their environmental performance.  Histograms of each 
program shed some light on this aspect of VEP performance by showing the varying levels of 
emission change across facilities.    Figures 2-5 below illustrate the frequency of percentage 
change amongst the individual firms in each VEP. 
Figure 2 Responsible Care Histogram 
 
Figure 3 ISO 14001 Histogram 
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Figure 4 ELP Histogram 
 
Figure 5 Climate Leaders Histogram 
 
The histograms show a precise comparison between the performances of the individual firms in 
each VEPs. Negative percent changes represent a reduction in emissions and positive percent 
changes reflect an increase in emissions.  Figure 1 shows that Responsible Care has eight firms, 
which represent 10% of the total sampled population, with emission reductions equal to or 
greater than -60%, whereas ISO 14001 in Figure 3 has fifteen firms with emission reductions 
equal to or greater than -60%.  ELP in Figure 4 has two firms with emission reductions equal to 
or greater than -60%, whereas Climate Leaders has zero firms with emission reductions equal to 
0
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or greater than -60%.  Comparing emission increases reveal significant differences.  For 
example, Figure 1 shows that Responsible Care has 8 firms with emission increases between 1% 
and 20%, whereas ISO 14001 has 15 firms with increases between 1% and 20%.  However, ELP 
and Climate Leaders have no emission increases greater than 20%. 
Figure 2 illustrates that most of the firms in Responsible Care (70%) make an emission 
reduction.  It also appears that a moderate number of firms made substantial emission increases.  
ISO 14001’s histogram in Figure 3 displays both negative and positive percent changes.  Like 
Responsible Care, a large majority of participating firms made emission reductions (68%), and a 
moderate number of firms made substantial emission increases (32%).  ELP’s histogram in 
Figure 4 reveals that a comparable 64% of firms made emission reductions and 36% made 
emission increases.  Unlike Responsible Care, ELP and ISO 14001, Climate Leaders’ histogram 
illustrates a relatively trivial number of firms with percent increase (6%).  It appears that the 
majority of the firms (94%) have emission reductions.   The number of firms with emission 
increases in ISO 14001 and Responsible Care suggest little consistency amongst firms in making 
reductions.  However, the small number of increases in Climate Leaders suggests a greater 
consistency amongst firms in making reductions.  Table 3 displays the percentage of firms with 
emission increases and decreases in each VEP. 
Table 3 Percentages of Firms with Increases and Decreases in Emissions, 2007-2009 
 Responsible Care ISO 14001 Environmental 
Leadership Program 
Climate Leaders 
Decrease 
Increase 
70%    (52) 
30%    (25) 
68%    (60) 
32%    (28) 
64%   (10) 
36%    (5) 
94%   (48) 
6%      (3) 
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The preceding descriptive data analysis results offer significant information about the 
performance of each VEP.  It appears that ELP reduces emissions the most, but Climate Leaders 
was more consistent in reducing emissions.  This analysis shows the performance of the VEPs; 
relative to one another, but it does not assess the efficacy of the design features covered in the 
Literature Review.  The specific hypotheses concerning these design features are as follows:  
1.) H1: Sanctioning programs will reduce emissions more than non-sanctioning programs  
H0: There will be no difference in emission reductions between sanctioning programs and 
non-sanctioning programs 
2.)  H1: Programs with reduction targets will reduce emissions more than programs 
without reduction targets 
H0:  There will be no difference in emission reductions between programs with reduction 
targets and programs without reduction targets. 
The results of the preceding descriptive analysis offer evidence that some programs 
outperform the others in reducing emissions.  However, the data spread in each VEP suggest that 
further analysis of the differences in means is necessary.  Differences of means tests examine the 
differences across VEPs.  To test the effects of sanctioning and reduction targets on program 
performance the study employs a difference of means test on the combined means of programs 
with sanctioning (Climate Leaders) and those without and programs with reduction targets 
(Climate Leaders and ELP) to those without.  Tables A-1 through A-6 in Appendix A present the 
results of the difference of means test for all VEPs.  
The statistics of most interest are the one-tail p values for each comparison.  All the p-
values are greater than the alpha level .05.  Therefore, the tests show no statistical significance 
  
28 
  
between the means of the programs.  Furthermore, the results in Tables A-1, A-2, A-3 can 
answer hypothesis 1 because Climate Leaders is the only VEP with sanctioning.  However, the t-
test results mean we cannot reject the null hypothesis in hypothesis 2.  Thus, there is no 
statistical significance between the difference in means of programs with sanctioning and those 
without.  The results show there is no significant differences in the performances of these VEPs, 
despite the variation in their design features.   
To more directly test the effects of sanctioning and reduction targets, a difference in 
means test examines on the combined means of the programs without sanctioning in comparison 
to the one program with sanctioning (Climate Leaders) and the combined means of programs 
without reduction targets in comparison to those with explicit targets (Climate Leaders and ELP).  
Tables A-7 and A-8 present the differences in combined means test. 
The tables show a p-value greater than the alpha level .05.  The results show that there is 
no statistical significance between the differences in combined means of programs without 
sanctioning to Climate Leaders; and there is no statistical significance between the differences in 
combined means of programs without explicit reduction targets and Climate Leaders and ELP.  
Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis in each hypothesis.   
The results of the t-tests provide a vital analysis of the relationship between the means of 
the programs. However, the tests do not address the differences in the distribution of emissions 
changes across the four VEPs.  To test whether some VEPs and program design features are 
more effective in reducing emissions, I examine the proportion of firms in each program that had 
a negative percent change in emissions.  Tests of proportions can then determine whether the 
differences in rates, found in Table 3, are statistically significant; and compare differences in 
proportions across design features.   
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Table 4 Climate Leaders and Responsible Care Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      1: Number of obs =       51 
                                                   2: Number of obs =       82 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           1 |   .9411765   .0329478                         .8766    1.005753 
           2 |   .7439024   .0482007                      .6494307    .8383742 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |    .197274   .0583855                        .0828405    .3117075 
             |  under Ho:   .0685806     2.88   0.004 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         diff = prop(1) - prop(2)                                  z =   2.8765 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                       Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.9980         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.0040          Pr(Z > z) = 0.0020 
 
Table 5 Climate Leaders and ISO 14001 Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      1: Number of obs =       51 
                                                   3: Number of obs =       88 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           1 |   .9411765   .0329478                         .8766    1.005753 
           3 |   .7272727   .0474757                       .634222    .8203234 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .2139037   .0577884                      .1006406    .3271669 
             |  under Ho:   .0696237     3.07   0.002 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(1) - prop(3)                                  z =   3.0723 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.9989         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.0021    Pr(Z > z) = 0.0011 
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Table 6 Climate Leaders and ELP Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      1: Number of obs =       51 
                                                   4: Number of obs =       14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           1 |   .9411765   .0329478                         .8766    1.005753 
           4 |   .7142857   .1207363                      .4776469 .9509246 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .2268908   .1251512                      -.018401    .4721825 
             |  under Ho:   .0935314     2.43   0.015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(1) - prop(4)                                  z =   2.4258 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.9924         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.0153          Pr(Z > z) = 0.0076 
 
The results of Tables 4-6 show z values greater than 1.96. 1.96 is the Z score found on the z table 
for an alpha level of .05.  The results can provide some support for hypothesis 1 because Climate 
Leaders is the only program with sanctioning.  The results show that there is a statistical 
significance between the differences in proportions of Climate Leaders and Responsible Care, 
ISO 14001 and ELP.  Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis in hypothesis 1.  Whereas, the results 
of Tables A-9, A-10, and A-11 in Appendix A, show z values less than 1.96.  Therefore, there is 
no statistical significance between ISO 14001 and Responsible Care, ELP and Responsible Care 
and ISO 14001 and ELP.  
Again, to more directly test the hypotheses regarding design features, difference of 
proportions test examine the proportions of the participating firms without sanctioning to firms 
with sanctioning (Climate Leaders).  Furthermore, difference of proportions tests examines the 
proportion of participating firms with reduction targets to firms without reduction targets 
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(Climate Leaders and ELP).  Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the difference in combined 
proportions. 
The tables show z values less than -1.96. -1.96 is the Z score on the z table for an alpha 
level of .05.  Table 7 shows that there is a statistical significance in the differences of proportions 
in the combined programs without sanctioning and Climate Leaders.  The results mean I can 
reject the null hypothesis in hypothesis 1.  Table 8 shows that there is a statistical significance in 
the differences of proportions in the combined programs without reduction targets and Climate 
Leaders and ELP.  The results suggest that having these design features may have an impact on 
the proportion of firms that can effectively reduce emissions.  
Table 7 Sanctions Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      184 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       51 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .7336957   .0325865                      .6698272    .7975641 
           1 |   .9411765   .0329478                         .8766    1.005753 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.2074808   .0463405                     -.2983064   -.1166552 
             |  under Ho:     .06569    -3.16   0.002 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(0) - prop(1)                                  z =  -3.1585 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.0008         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.0016          Pr(Z > z) = 0.9992 
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Table 84 Reduction Targets Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      170 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       65 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     0 |   .7352941   .0338367                          .6689754    .8016128 
     1 |   .8923077   .0384497                          .8169477    .9676677 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 diff |  -.1570136   .0512182                         -.2573993   -.0566278 
        |  under Ho:   .0605358    -2.59   0.009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(0) - prop(1)                                  z =  -2.5937 
   Ho: diff = 0 
 
   Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.0047         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.0095    Pr(Z > z) = 0.9953 
 
The preceding results reveal the differences amongst the VEPs’ data.  Table 9 shows the 
results of comparing the design features of each VEP.   Table 9 illustrates the similarities and 
differences between the program design features and program performance. 
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Table 9 Program Design Features and Program Performance 
 
The table shows multiple similarities and differences between the VEPs.  Responsible 
Care and ISO 14001 require auditing but no public disclosure of audit findings, whereas, Climate 
Leaders and ELP does not require auditing.  Responsible Care and ISO 14001 require 
certification, but only ISO 14001 and Climate Leaders allow self-certification.  Climate Leaders 
is the only VEP with some form of sanctioning, which is expulsion for underperformance.  ISO 
14001 is the only VEP that does not require reporting.  Climate Leaders and ELP differs from 
Responsible Care and ISO 14001 by encouraging firms to set explicit reduction goals.  
Program Auditing  Certification Sanctioning  Reporting  Reduction 
Targets  
% 
Change 
% of  
Firms 
with  
Reduc. 
Responsible 
Care 
Mandatory-
Yes 
Public 
Disclosure- 
No 
Mandatory-
Yes 
Third Party-
Yes 
Self-No 
 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-
No 
Yes No -12% 70% 
Climate 
Leaders 
Mandatory-
No 
Public 
Disclosure-No 
Mandatory-
No 
Third Party-
Yes 
Self-Yes 
 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-
Yes 
Yes Yes -16% 94% 
ISO 14001 Mandatory-
Yes  
Public 
Disclosure- 
No 
Mandatory-
Yes 
Third Party-
Yes 
Self-Yes 
 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-
No 
No No -18% 68% 
ELP Mandatory-
No 
Public 
Disclosure-No 
Mandatory-
No 
Third Party-
No 
Self-No 
Formal-No 
Expulsion-
No 
Yes Yes -20% 64% 
  
34 
  
The program design features and the data results of each VEP provide greater insight into 
each program’s performance.  For example, Climate Leaders was the only VEP with consistent 
emission reductions and the only VEP to have some form of sanctioning.  Considering the 
consistency in reductions, Climate Leaders’ data  results theoretically supports arguments that 
sanctioning controls free riding and shirking and contributes to positive environmental 
performance (Rivera, Deleon, & Koerber 2006; Prakash and Potoski 2007 ).  Climate Leaders 
does not have mandatory certification, which also supports the argument that certification is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for positive performance (Andrews, Hutson, and Edwards 2006; 
Matthews, 2001). 
The data results offer support and alternatives to many arguments about ISO 14001 and 
Responsible Care.  The striking evidence is the notion of extensive “free-riding” and “shirking” 
within ISO 14001 and Responsible Care.  The significant number of firms with substantial 
emission increases illustrates this.  Furthermore, since each VEP reduced total emissions, this is 
evidence that underperforming firms actually benefit from the VEP’s overall performance.  The 
results support that weak programs, as classified by Prakash and Potoski (2007), are still 
successful but without sanctioning mechanisms, “free riding” and “shirking” will be more 
prevalent.  Moreover, Responsible Care and ISO 14001 are the only VEPs that require 
mandatory auditing and certification, yet they are still plagued with substantial “free riding” and 
“shirking.”  This suggests that the arguments that those elements may not be as important as 
sanctioning to curb free riding are valid.  Responsible Care, which exhibits the free riding 
dilemma, requires reporting but lacks any sanctioning mechanisms.  Climate Leaders, which 
exhibits little “free riding”, also requires reporting but has some form of sanctioning.  This is 
consistent with existing work (Delmas and Kreller 2005) that shows that despite an EMS system 
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requiring reporting (found in Responsible Care) the lack of sanctioning mechanisms does not 
eliminate free riding. 
 The analyses of the design features show that Climate Leaders and ELP are the only 
VEPs that encourage firms to set reduction targets.  ELP is relatively successful but also has a 
moderate number of firms with emission increases.  This suggests that explicit reduction targets 
alone may not curb “free riding” or “shirking”. Though both, ELP and Climate Leaders have 
explicit reduction targets, only Climate Leaders has little free riding.  This suggests that the 
combination of sanctioning mechanisms and reduction targets may influence effectiveness.  This 
offers an alternative to recent literature, which contends that requiring programs to set 
performance target goals results in underperformance (Darnall and Sides 2008). 
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Discussion 
This study had two objectives: identifying the ability of VEPs to reduce emissions and 
analyzing the effects that various design features have on environmental performance.  The 
findings of this research both support and offer alternatives to the current literature.  First, the 
findings reveal that the studied VEPs have the ability to reduce emissions.  Second, the findings 
show statistical significance between the differences in proportions of programs with sanctioning 
and explicit targets to programs without.  Third, the study reveals the similarities and differences 
of the design features of each VEP.  Furthermore, the study offers insights into the effective 
combination of features found in effective programs.   
This study is not without limitations.  There are multiple reasons that may account for the 
VEP’s data. Substantial emission increases and decreases outside of the VEPs influence are 
possible (e.g., production of new products at the facility, increase in current productions, and/or 
use of new equipment).  Furthermore, many explanations could account for Climate Leaders’ 
consistency in emission reductions.  Last, the difference in contaminants may explain the 
difference in VEP performance.   
While the research cannot answer the question of which features determine success, it 
does illuminate the design features of effective VEPs.  Additional research such as the 
examination and comparison of more VEPs, the analysis of program implementation, the 
surveying of participants and more features beyond expulsion and reduction targets would 
expand this research and offers for future areas for research.  Despite future empirical research, 
many critics will remain skeptical of VEPs ability to reduce emissions.  While literature 
identifies varies factors that contribute to the success of VEPs it does suggest that program 
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design influences their performance.  Continued research and improvement in the institutional 
design of VEPs are necessary for them to be a viable instrument over command and control 
policies. Despite the criticisms, VEPs are most likely here to stay. 
The central implication offered from this research is that the viability of VEPs, as a 
policy instrument, depends on their institutional design.  A strategic design is necessary to foster 
pollution reduction and control underperformers through enforcement mechanisms.  The results 
of this study suggest a combination of sanctioning and explicit reduction targets may influence 
program performance and control underperformers.  The study offers implications for the future 
of VEPs, government and environmental policies.  Although, arguments are valid about the 
influence of sanctioning critics and scholars cannot expect VEPs to do it independently.  Instead, 
governments must bridge the gap between voluntary efforts and existing government policies.  
VEPs should not continue to function outside of enforcement features.  Mandating these features 
through government is necessary to ensure program performance.  Despite the voluntary nature 
of the programs, firms receive significant benefits such as tax breaks and lax regulation for their 
participation.  Thus, if governments legally allow these benefits then they should legally enforce 
these features.  Despite the mandates, VEPs will remain voluntary because government 
regulation does not require VEP membership as a requirement of environmental compliance.  
Furthermore, the mandates will help control free riding and shirking firms by deterring them 
from joining. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Table A-1 Climate Leaders and Responsible Care T-Test 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |      51    -15.2623    1.529606    10.92357    -18.3346   -12.18999 
       2 |      82   -14.35514    3.529356    31.95968   -21.37745 -7.332828 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |133     -14.703  2.2481    25.92635 -19.14996   -10.25603 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.9071587    4.640483               -10.08714    8.272824 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =  -0.1955 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      131 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4227         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8453          Pr(T > t) = 0.5773 
 
Table A-2 Climate Leaders and ISO 14001 T-Test 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |      51    -15.2623    1.529606    10.92357    -18.3346   -12.18999 
       3 |      88   -19.51113    4.394515     41.2242   -28.24571   -10.77656 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |139  -17.95221  2.837113    33.44907   -23.56204  -12.34238 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            4.248836    5.896888               -7.411855    15.90953 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(3)                                      t =   0.7205 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      137 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7638         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4724          Pr(T > t) = 0.2362 
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Table A-3 Climate Leaders and ELP T-Test 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |      51    -15.2623    1.529606    10.92357    -18.3346   -12.18999 
       4 |      14    -18.6758    6.477139    24.23524   -32.66881    -4.68279 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |65   -15.99751    1.816704    14.64674  -19.6268   -12.36823 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |              3.4135    4.433373                -5.44589    12.27289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(4)                                      t =   0.7700 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       63 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7779         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4442          Pr(T > t) = 0.2221 
 
Table A-4 Responsible Care and ISO 14001 T-Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2 |      82   -14.35514    3.529356    31.95968   -21.37745   -7.332828 
3 |      88   -19.51113    4.394515     41.2242   -28.24571   -10.7765               
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined | 170   -17.02412    2.839937  37.02824 -22.63044 -11.4178     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |              5.155995    5.686407               -6.070026    16.38202 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(2) - mean(3)                                      t =   0.9067 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       168 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8171         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3659          Pr(T > t) = 0.1829 
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Table A-5 Responsible Care and ELP T-Test 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       2 |      82   -14.35514    3.529356    31.95968   -21.37745   -
7.332828 
       4 |      14    -18.6758    6.477139    24.23524   -32.66881    -4.68279 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Combined 96   -14.98524    3.151751    30.88073   -21.24225   -
8.728218 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            4.320659    8.966323               -13.48218     22.1235 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(2) - mean(4)                                      t =   0.4819 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6845         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6310          Pr(T > t) = 0.3155 
 
 
Table A-6 ISO 14001 and ELP T-Test 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       3 |      88   -19.51113    4.394515     41.2242   -28.24571   -10.77656 
       4 |      14    -18.6758    6.477139    24.23524   -32.66881    -4.68279 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |102   -19.39648    3.885054    39.23713 -27.10338 -11.68958 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.8353359    11.34595               -23.34538     21.6747 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(3) - mean(4)                                      t =  -0.0736 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      100 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4707         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9415          Pr(T > t) = 0.5293 
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Table A-7 Responsible Care and ISO 14001 Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      2: Number of obs =       82 
                                                   3: Number of obs =       88 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           2 |   .7439024   .0482007                      .6494307    .8383742 
           3 |   .7272727   .0474757                       .634222    .8203234 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0166297   .0676554                     -.1159725    .1492319 
             |  under Ho:   .0677156     0.25   0.806 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(2) - prop(3)                                  z =   0.2456 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.5970         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.8060          Pr(Z > z) = 0.4030 
 
Table A-8 Responsible Care and ELP Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      2: Number of obs =       82 
                                                   4: Number of obs =       14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           2 |   .7439024   .0482007                      .6494307    .8383742 
           4 |   .7142857   .1207363                      .4776469    .9509246 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0296167   .1300022                     -.2251829    .2844164 
             |  under Ho:   .1269091     0.23   0.815 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(2) - prop(4)                                  z =   0.2334 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.5923         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.8155          Pr(Z > z) = 0.4077 
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Table 5 ISO 14001 and ELP Test of Proportion 
Two-sample test of proportion                      3: Number of obs =       88 
                                                   4: Number of obs =       14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           3 |   .7272727   .0474757                       .634222    .8203234 
           4 |   .7142857   .1207363                      .4776469    .9509246 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |    .012987   .1297351                     -.2412892    .2672632 
             |  under Ho:   .1284072     0.10   0.919 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diff = prop(3) - prop(4)                                  z =   0.1011 
    Ho: diff = 0 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(Z < z) = 0.5403         Pr(|Z| < |z|) = 0.9194          Pr(Z > z) = 0.4597 
 
Table A-10 Sanctions T-Test 
Two-sample t test with equal variances  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     184    -17.1498    2.666331    36.16788    -22.4105   -11.88909 
       1 |      51    -15.2623    1.529606    10.92357    -18.3346   -12.18999 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined| 235   -16.74017   2.112897    32.39009  -20.9029  -12.57744 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -1.887498    5.135186               -12.00483    8.229834 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.3676 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      233 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3568         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7135          Pr(T > t) = 0.6432 
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Table A-11 Reduction Targets T-Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     170   -17.02412    2.839937    37.02824  -22.63044  -11.4178 
       1 |      65   -15.99751    1.816704    14.64674    -19.6268   -12.36823 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined| 235   -16.74017    2.112897  32.39009   -20.9029   -12.57744 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -1.026611    4.733159               -10.35187    8.298647 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.2169 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      233 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4142         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8285          Pr(T > t) = 0.5858 
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